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[L. A. No. 26913. In Bllnk. Oct. 25, 1962.] 
TEITELBAUM FURS, INC. et aI., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. THE DOMINION INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., 
et a1., Defendants and Appellants. 
(1] Judgments-Res Judicata: Action on Different Claim or Cause. 
-The doctl'ine of res judicllta has a double aspect. It pre-
cludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of 
action that has been finally determined by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, and any issue necessarily decided in such 
litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties or their 
privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different 
cause of action. 
[2] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause.-In 
determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three ques-
tions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior ad-
judication identical with the one presented in the action in 
question 'I 'Vas there a final jUdgment on the merits' Was 
the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in 
privity with a party to the prior adjudication' 
[3] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim. or Oause-As 
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-The application of col-
lateral estoppel in a civil case to issues determined in a pre-
vious criminal action is not precluded. 
[4] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Oause-As 
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-A plea of guilty in a 
criminal prosecution is admissible in a subsequent civil action 
on the independent ground that it is an admission, but it would 
not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel to make 
such a plea conclusive. 
[6] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Oause.-The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, whereby an issue necessarily 
decided in an action in a court of competent jurisdiction is 
concl~ively detcrmined as to the parties or their privies if it 
is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of 
action, is based on the public policy of limiting litigation by 
preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from 
[1J See Oal.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§ 213-215; Am.Jur., Judgments 
(rev ed §§ 324, 373). 
[3) See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 225; Am.Jur., Judgments (rev 
eel § 472 et seq). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §§ 338,367; [2, 5] Judg-
ments, § 367; [3,4,6-11] Judgments, § 376. 
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again drawing it into controversy. This policy must be con-
sidered together with the policy that a party shall not be de-
prived of a fllir adversary proceeding in which fully to present 
his case. 
[6] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on· Di1ferent Claim or Cause-As 
Mected by Nature of Proceeding.-Considerations of fairness 
to civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration 
of criminal justice combine to prohibit the application of 
collateral estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty 
to a criminal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate his 
cause in 11 civil action. 
(7] leL-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As 
Mected by Na.ture of Proceeding.-To preclude a civil litigant 
from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a 
criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from 
relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, since there 
are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a. 
unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record pa.id for 
by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious 
trials are served and no injustice done when criminal defend-
ants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in con-
formity with these safeguards. 
[8] ld.-Res Judica~Action on Different Claim or Cause-As 
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-Where a criminal defend-
ant, although not having the initiative in his criminal trial, 
was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt 
with all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant and, 
being charged with felonies punishable in the state prison, had 
every motive to make as vigorous and effective defense as 
possible, any issue necessarily decided in the criminal prosecu-
tion is conclusively determined as to the parties if it is in-
volved in a subsequent civil action. 
[9] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As 
Mected by Nature of Proceeding.-A criminal judgment that 
is subject to collateral attack on the ground, for example, that 
it was obtained through the knowing usc of perjured testimony 
or suppression of evidence, or that has in effect been set aside 
by a pardon based on defendant's innocence, is not res judicata 
in a subsequent action. 
(10] ld.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As 
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-A defendant's election not 
to testify in his own behalf in a criminal prosecution, pre-
sumably made on the assumption that he would benefit thereby, 
no more defeats the plea of collateral estoppel in a subsequent 
civil action in which /lny issue necessarily determined in the 
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criminal case is involved than does failure of a litigant to 
introduce relevant available evidence in any other situation. 
[11] Id.-Res Judicata-Action on Different Claim or Cause-As 
Affected by Nature of Proceeding.-Where a criminal defend-
ant's claimed inability to compel the testimony of an nlleged 
coconspirator did not warrant a reversal of his conviction, 
such claim will not sustain a collateral attack on the criminal 
judgment which would render it unavailable as res judicata in 
a subsequent civil action involving any issue necessarily de-
termined in the criminal case. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order granting a new trial. A. A. 
Scott, Judge. Order reversed with directions. . 
Action to recover under contracts of insurance for losses 
allegedly arising out of a robbery. Orders denying defendants' 
motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict and granting 
their motion for new trial reversed with directions. 
Leland, Plattner &; Kalik and Horace L. Kalik for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
Thomas P. Menzies and James O. White, Jr., for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
TRAYNOR, J.-AUeging losses by robbery, plaintiff cor-
porations brought this action to reco,'cr $244,510.90 under 
contracts of insurance with defendant insurers. The jury 
returned a verdict for plaintiffs, and the trial court granted 
defendants' motion for new trial on the ground that the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the verdict. The trial court 
denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting a new trial. 
Defendants appeal from the judgment. 
We agree with defendants' contention that their plea of 
collateral estoppel defeats' plaintiffs' action. In a criminal 
action that became final before the present action was com-
menced. Albert Teitelbaum, president of plaintifl' corporations, 
was convicted of conspiracy to commit grand theft, attempted 
grand theft, and the filing of a false and fraudulent insurance 
claim. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. (People v. 
Teitelbaum, 163 Cal.App.2d 184 [329 P.2d 157], petition for 
hearing denied Oct. 22, 1958, cert. den., 359 U.S. 206 [79 S.Ct. 
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738, 3 L.Ed.2d 759).) Plaintiff corporations concede that the 
claim in this case is for the same lo!;!; iuvoh'ed ill thc criminal 
conviction and that they nre mere alter egos of Teitelbaum. 
The issue adjudicated ndvcrsely to plaintiffs in the criminal 
action is idehtical with the issue in this action: whether the 
allcged robbery occurred as plaintiffs f'ontelld- or whether it 
was staged by 'feitelbaum as defendants contend. By its 
verdict, the previous jury necessarily found against plaintiffs 
on this issue. 
[1] The doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect: 
(1) it "precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a 
cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction." (2)" AllY issue necessarily decided 
in such litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties 
or their privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a 
different cause of action." (Bernhard v. Bank 0/ America, 
19 Ca1.2d 807, 810 [122 P.2d 892] ; see Taylor v. Hawkinson, 
47 Ca1.2d 893, 895-896 [306 P.2d 797].) In the present case, 
since plaintiffs' cause of action is different from that of the 
state in the criminal proceeding, we are concerned with the 
latter aspect, often termed collateral estoppel. 
[2] In the Bernhard case, supra, this court rejected the 
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel that had been applied to 
limit the scope of collateral estoppel, and held three questions 
to be pertinent in determining the validity of the plea. "Was 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the 
one presented in the action in question T Was there a final 
judgment on the merits T Was the party against whom the 
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the 
prior adjudication fIt (19 Ca1.2d at p. 813.) The record in 
the present case provides affirmative answers to each of these 
questions. 
Notwithstanding the apparent applicability of collateral 
estoppel, it is contended that the cases in this state do not 
indicate that a criminal conviction is conclusive in a subse-
quent civil action. Additionally, plaintiffs urge that the plea 
be rejectei on the ground that since plaintiffs did not have 
the initiative in the criminal action and since Teitelbaum chose 
not to testify and was una1:l1e to utilize an important witness 
in the criminal proceeding, they did not have a full and com-
plete day in court on the issue now sought to be foreclosed 
against them. 
[3] The cases do not preclude the application of collateral 
I 
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estoppel in a civil case to issues determined in a previous 
criminal prosecution. Those relied upon for the contrary 
proposition are either based upon the doctrine of mutuality of 
estoppel (Risd{)n v. Yates, 145 Cal. 210 [78 P. 641] ; Burbank 
v. McIntyre, 135 Cal.App. 482 [27 P.2d 400] ; Balestreiri v. 
Arques, 49 Cal.App.2d 664 [122 P.2d 277] ; American Fire 
etc. Service v. Williams, 171 Cal.App.2d 397 [340 P.2d 644]) 
or involve a prior acquittal (In re Anderson, 107 Cal.App.2d 
670 [237 P.2d 720] ; People v. One 1950 Pont'iac 2-Door Coupe, 
193 Cal.App.2d 216[13 Cal.Rptr. 916]) or involve the admis-
sibility as an admission in a civil suit of a plea of guilty in 
a previous criminal action (Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Ca1.2d 586 
[191 P.2d 432]). 
Since the requirement of mutuality of estoppel was expressly 
abandoned in the Bernhard case, Risdon v. Yates, supra, and 
the cases following it are no longer authoritative. 
In re Anderson, supra, rejected the plea as applied to a 
former acquittal on the ground that" 'the difference in degree 
in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes 
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was 
merely ... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient 
to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused.'" (107 Cal.App.2d 670, 672; see Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 [58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917]; 
Annot.18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1315.) 
[ 4] A plea of guilty is admissible in a subsequent civil 
action on the independent ground that .it is an admission. 
It would not serve the policy underlying collateral estoppel, 
however, to make such a plea conclusive. [5] ., The rule 
is based upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation 
by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue 
from again drawing it into controversy." (Bernhard v. Bank 
of America, 19 Ca1.2d 807, 811 [122 P.2d 892].) "This policy 
must be considered together with the policy that a party shall 
not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully 
to present hili case." (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Ca1.2d 13, 
18 [193 P.2d 728].) When a plea of guilty has been entered 
in the prior action, no issues have been "drawn into contro-
versy" by a "full presentation" of the case. It may reflect 
only a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more advan-
tageous than litigation. [6] Considerations of fairness to 
civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration of 
criminal justice (see Vaughn v. J011as, 31 Cal.2d 586,594 [191 
.-) 
) 
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P.2d 432]) combine to prohibit the application of collateral 
estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty to a crim-
inal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate his cause ina 
civil action. 
Collateral estoppel applies to successive criminal trials (Peo-
ple v. Beltran, 94 Cal.App.2d 197, 203 [210 P.2d 238] ; People 
v. Maja(].o, 22 Cal.App.2d 323, 326 [70 P.2d 1015] ; see People 
v. Joseph, 153 Cal.App.2d 548, 551 [314 P.2d 1004] ; Scalfon v. 
U1Iited States, 332 U.S. 575, 578 [68 S. Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180] ; 
Annot. 147 A.L.R. 991, 992) and, although not widely adopted, 
has been applied in the better reasoned cases that have dealt 
with the problem here presented. (Eaglc ctc. Ins. Co. v. Heller, 
149 Va. 82 [140 S.E. 314, 57 A.L.R. 490] ; Minco v. Eureka 
cte. 111s. 00., 182 Pa. Super. 75 [125 A.2d 612] ; A1tstin v. 
United States, 125 F.2d 816; see 25 So.Ca1.L.Rev. 480; 40 Cal. 
L.Rev. 225; 50 Yale L.J. 499.) Thus it is significant that this 
court found support in Eagle etc. IlIs. 00. v. Heller, supra, 
in reaching its decision to abandon the requirement of mu-
tuality of estoppel in the Bernhard case. [7] To preclude 
a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found 
against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to 
preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive 
civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust 
conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061) and of a unani-
mous verdict (Pen. Code, § 1164), the right to counsel (In ,·c 
James, 38 Cal.2d 302 [240 P.2d 596]), and a record paid for 
by the state on appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 33-). Sta-
bility of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no 
injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from 
relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safe-
guards. 
[8] Plaintiffs contend, however, that in the absence of 
mutuality, collateral estoppel ought not be applied against 
a party who did not have the initiative in the previous action. 
(See Ne'varov v. Oaldwell, 161 Cal.App.2d 762 [327 P.2d 
111] ; Currie, Mutuality of Oollateral Estoppel: Limits of the 
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 281, 313.) Although plain-
tiffs' president did not have the initiative ill his criminal trial, 
he was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his 
guilt with all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant, 
and since he was charged with felonies punishable in the state 
·Former17 Rules on Appeal, rule 33. 
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prison (Pen. Code, § 17), he had every motive to make as 
vigorous and effective a defense as possible. Under these cir-
cumstances, we hold that any issue necessarily decided in a 
prior criminal proceeding is conclusively determined as to the 
parties if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. 
[9] It should be noted, however, that a criminal judg-
ment that is subject to collateral attack on the ground, for 
example, that it was obtained through the knowing use of 
perjured testimony (Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 
S.Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A..L.R. 406] ; Alcorta v. Textu, 
355 U.S. 28 [78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L. Ed.2d 9]) or suppression of 
evidence (People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2d 737, 747 [312 P.2d 665]), 
or that has in effect been set aside by a pardon based on the 
defendant's innocence (see Pen. Code, § 4900), is not res 
judicata ill a subsequent action. (See Rest., Judgments, § 11.) 
Plaintiffs have advanced no grounds that would sustain a 
collateral attack on the judgment, but they contend that there 
are special reasons why collateral estoppel should not apply 
in this case. They point out that Teitelbaum chose not to take 
the stand in the criminal prosecution except for the limited 
purpose of denying an alleged admission, and contend that 
he was unable to secure the testimony of an alleged co-con-
spirator. 
[10] Teitelbaum's election not to testify in his own be-
half in the criminal case was presumably made on the assump-
tion that he would benefit thereby. His error, if any, in trial 
strategy would no more defeat the plea of collateral estoppel 
than the failure of a litigant to introduce relevant available 
evidence in any other situation. 
[11] Teitelbaum urged his inability to compel the testi-
mony of the alleged co-conspirator on his appeal from the 
judgment in the criminal case, and it was determined that it 
did not warrant a reversal. A fortiori, it will not sustain a 
collateral attack upon the criminal judgment. 
The order d~nying defendants' motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and the order granting a new trial 
. are reversed and the trial court,is directed to enter judgment 
for defendants. Defendants shall recover their costs on these 
appeals. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., and 
Tobriner, J., concurred . 
. Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
